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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.JIYTIL 'WELLS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.BLF1£ f-lHIELD OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
11871

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ST,\11 E111£K1 1 OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Action hy plailltiff to recow-r benefits claimed under
a medical
contract issued by defendant.

SOTTGHT ON APPEAL
'rlw Plaintiff and Respondent seeks affirmation of
the judgment in Plaintiff/Respondt>nt's favor and an
Order directing tht> Dt>fendant/ Appellant to pay costs
of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tlw ease came before the court on August 12, 1969,
OH a l\lotion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant
and for trial. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg1

ment was denied (TR 23). Submitted with said motio:
and received in evidence by the court was the medica
pre-payment contract issued by defendant (Exhibit '·A''
TR 24). On motion of the plaintiff, plaintiff's depositi1·1
was also received in evidence. Portions of this depositirr
were read in the record.
Upon the denial of defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment plaintiff made an oral Motion for Summary
Judgment based upon the pleadings and the evidence in.
asmuch as no fnrtlwr Pvidence ·was required for deter
mination of the case; tlw defrndant stipulated that sairi
motion might be considered immediately without noticr.
The court granted the motion of the plaintiff and
that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff for $7SO.U11
plus costs (TR 23).
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La11
were signed and entered by the court on or about Angmi
26, 1969. Thereafter defendant filf'd a motion nndPr
rules 52B, 59A and 59E to amend the findings of fact.
conclusions of law and judgment, or in the alternatiw
for a new trial. Defendant's motion to amend was }ward
on September 9, 1969. ThP court granted def endant'f
motion to amend the conclusions of law and judgment
(TR 34, 35 and 36).
On April 16, 1968, plaintiff was injnred in an acci·
dent at his home in Corinne, Utah, while he was attempt·
ing to repair a damaged fuel tank. Hp was using a jack
on the inside of this tank, when it slipped whilf' nndrr
pressure and the handle struek plaintiff in the month
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p.
'l'R 4-5). This accident broke lllaintii'i'.-., in11,
'l<)('kPd out tlll'<'l' teeth and broke several
(li\wr [(-, tl1, and forced his teeth into the back of his
1Potttl1 I jil.':-; dq>n. ]J. +and 5, TR 4).
(]ii.\.: d·r;

A ftf'l' tlw aecidrnt, plaintiff was taken by his wife
to tl1P offir<' of Dr. H.J. Griffin, D.D.S. where he received
treatrnPnt and was then referred to Dr. ·white,
an oral surgPon, in Tremonton, Uta11, for hospitalization
and trPahu(•nt of tlie fractnrPcl jaw (TR 5, G, 7). Plaintiff
was nnd('l' Dr. \Yhite's car0 for ahont S(:'n'n weeks until
tli<· fractnre ht·alecl (pl. 's de po. p. 7). After his discharge
11_1 Dr. White, plaintiff rdurnecl to Dr. Griffin for the
d('ntal rPpairs mad<' necessary as a result of the accident
(TH li-7). Dr. Griffin 1wrforrned only dental serYices
for t1H' plaintiff (rrR 8). Plaintiff submitted to defendant tlw bill of Dr. White for oral surgical services perfornw<l in tlH· treatment of thl:' fracture which defendant
paid (TR 7, pl.'s ckpo. p. 7). ·when tlw dental bill of
Dr. Griffin \\'HI' sulnnittt>d to the dt>fendant, payment was
<kllied 011 the ground that the contract issued by the defrndant to the plaintiff excluded payment for dental
sPnic<'S and bPeanse Dr. Griffin was not a "participating
or nonparticipating
within the terms of the
rm•dical contract held by the plaintiff.
'rJwn' is no dispute regarding the occurrence of the
at'('i<lPnt wliieh plaintiff sustained on April 16, 1968, nor
is then• any dispnt<- that at the time of said accident
plaintiff was a. suhscrihPr to tlw contract issned by def1·ndant to plain ti ff, upon \\'hi<'h this snit was brought,
or that said ('Ontrnd was in good standing and in full
f11rr·e arnl dfret on th1•
of the accident (TR 9).
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Plaintiff had obtainPd this contract from defendan1
through the Fanners' Union of which he was a llH'lllhPr
and the contract was solicited by an agPnt of d<·frndant
Plaintiff/Respondent testified that tlwrn wen• no discu!.
sions about the exclusion of bmefits from the contr::iti
which he could recall (TR 11). Plaintiff had no n•colh
tion of any representations concerning thP contract made
by defendant's agent (pl.'s depo. p. 18-19) and after th1:
contract ·was delin.•red to plaintiff, he nPVPr read it in any
detail (pl. 's depo., p 20).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE co:NTRACT BETWEEN THE p ARTIES DOES BY
ITS TERMS ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO THE BENEFITS
SUED FOR IN HIS COMPLAINT AND THE CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND THE EV!·
DENCE.

The pertinent provisions of the contract in question,
a copy of which is a part of this Court's record and designated Defendant's Exhibit "A", read as follows:
"THIS CONTRACT . . . mtitles the subscrilwr
and family and dependants ... to have, on or after
the date membership beconws effective hereunder,
services from the participating physician of their
choice." (Emphasis supplied)
Aricle I, Definitions of Tenns, snbsection E, read5
as follows:
" 'Participating Physician' shall nwan any doctor
licensed as a physician and surgeon to practic1·
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medi<'i11e i11 all its branches .... " (Emphasis sup-

! li•·d)
.'.. rt-icl

i I. Svrvices Provided, subsection A(l), reads

a,.: f11llo>n;:

"'1'11<· following Sl'rvicE's ... shall he available to
tlw rnPmher ... when rendered by a participating
ph;.·sician. . . . :
Snrgical sPrvices rt>ndered by a participating
]Jhysician in tlw treatment of disease, illness or
injury. Tlw t<·rm 'Surgical Services' shall mean:
cutting, suturing and opPrative procedures; treatment of fractures and dislocations or orthopedic
f'asting; 01wrativP and major diagnostic endoscopic procPdnres; therapeutic surt,rical injections
and tlwrapentic surt,rical aspirations; destruction
of !Psions by Plectrieal means; biopsiPs of internal
organs."
.\rticl<> III, Lirnitations and I<Jxclnsions, subsection
B(7)
as [ollows:
"ThP s<'niees }ffovided hy this contract shall not
irn·lnde UH' following:
*

*

*

7. Physician services for extraction of teeth
or other dPntal JffOCPsses."
Dorland's Illustrated :JI(•dical Dictionary, 23rd Edition l 95S dPfint>s tJH' following tPnns:

:.1 Pdicine: ''The art or science of healing diseases;
es1wciall;.' the healing of disPases b>' the adrnini stra tion of intPrnal remedit>s."

DPntistr.\·: ''That <lepartnwnt of tlw }waling arts
wl1ieh is ron('t>rned with the teeth, oral cavity,
5

and associated parts, including the
and treatment of tlwir diseases and the re.
storation of defective and missing tissne."
Physician: "An authorized practitioner of mPdicine."

It is the position of the Plaintiff/Hesponclent that the
term "medicine in all its branches" as provided in the
contract prepared and written by the Defendant/Appellant includes Dentistry and related snrgical repair of
oral injuries such as tl10sf> sustained in the case at hand.
Dentistry is a department of the healing arts and deals
with diagnosis and treatment of diseases and is included
within the definition of nwdicine.
The Defendant/ Ap1wllant argues that a ''Dentist" is
not a "Physician" wihin the definition of Article I of the
policy in question; however, Article III, subparagraph
B(7) specifically excludes "Physician" sen·ices renderPd
for extraction of tedh or other dental processt>s.
The authors of the contract in question refer to dt>ntal services as ''Physician services for extraction of teeth .
. . . ", thereby admitting that a Dentist is an authoriud
practitioner of medicine and included within the Clanse
E, Article I definition of a participating physician practicing medicine in "all its branches."
POINT II
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS Aii!·
BIGUOUS AND THEREFORE TO BE CONSTRUED LIBER·
ALLY IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.

As statc'd above, on tl11• one hand, DPfrndant/ Appel·
lant argues that a "DPntist" is not includPd within tl1e
6

<l<'finition of ''Physician'' within the terms of the contract;
and on tlie otltPr hand, argues that "Physician Services
for Pxtraction of teeth or other dental processes," are
exclrnkd irn;,; coverage in the contract. It is apparent
u.· •
·::te" 1 }J;; t 1 his contradictory use of the term "Physic·ian" <'Onstitntes an ambiguity.
'l'lie contract definition of "Participating Physician"
1:- any doctor licensed as a ''physician and surgeon to
practice mt'dieinP in all its branches." (Emphasis supplied.) Tlw tt'rm "physician and surgeon" constitutes
anothl'r amhigllity; dof's the term "and" apply in the
{'Onjnnctive or disjunctive; that is, are services covered
which arP sole!:-· the result of surgical
Or,
arP st-nices n•nd<•rPd by a gem·ral practicing physician

a" wt'll a" those rendPrt>d by a surgeon covered f
Ttw 1manimous holding of most all courts as well as
tlw Utah 8u11rPrne Court, is that insurance contracts
rnnst }w libPrally construed in favor of a policy holder
or
thPreof, wherever possible, and strictly
<·onstrned against the insnrt'r in order to afford the
protPction whieh thP insnrt>d was Pndeavoring to secure
wl1Pn ht' ap1>lit'd for the insurance. Richards v. Standard
Ar'r:. l11s. Co., :200 Pac. 1017, 58 Ut. 622 (1921); Colovos
cs. Home J,ife /.its. Co. of N.Y., 28 P.2d 607, 83 Ut. 401
Gi/Json 1·s. RquitablP Life Ass. Soc. of U.S., 36
105, 84 Pt. 4S:2 (1934); Browning 11s. Equitable
Df<' Ass. Soc. of l1.S., 72 P.2d lOGO, 94 Ut. 532, rehearing
denied SO P.2d 348, 94 Ut. 570 (1937); Tucker vs. N.Y.
Lde ins. Co., 155 P.2d 173, 107 Ut. 478; Stout vs. Washi11gton Fire a11d Marine Inc. Co., 385 P.2d 608, 14 Ut. 2d
414.
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'The Courb> will protect the insnred against obscnr.
antism in the contract which conveys one meaning t11
lawyers and another to th<· la.nnan. Appleman, fosnranr·f·
Law and Practic0, \T ol. 13, SPc. 7401, Pt ::wq.
"\Vlwn literal construction of an insurancP })Oli('y
would lead to manifost injustice to tlw insured and liberal
but still reasonable constrndion th<·reof \\·onld prewnt
injustice by not requiring an impossibility, such liberal
construction should be adopkd. Fidelity and Gas Co. of
N.Y. 1:s. Groth, 53 N.Y. Snpp. 2d 62:3, affirmed 62 K.Y.
Supp. 2d SHl, :?70 App. Div. 97G. The mod<:>rn tendene)
is toward a strid(•r actotmtahility of imrnrers to insnn·ds.
Giam Ba!vm' rs. Phnc11i.r I 11s. Co. of Hartford Co1111 ..
36 N.Y. Supp. :2d 598, 178 l\lisc. 887. "\Vhen membPrs of
the public purchas<:> policies of insurance, tlwy are entitk'(I
to a broad measure of prot<:>ction
to fnlfill their
reasonable expectations and said insurance should not
be subjected to technical encumbrances or hidden pitfail1
and their policies should he constnwd lilwrally in tlwir
favor. Fidelity & Gas Co. of 1\'T. 1·s. Carll and Ra11111gosa, Inc. (DCN J 1965) 24;3 F<:>d. Supp. -lSl, dismissPd
( C.A.) 365 Fed. 2d 303.
The Courts have
felt that s111ce
language of insurance policies is select<'d by ont> of tlw
parties alone, that the languagP employed by that party
should be construed against it. Thus, if tlw
of the words employed is doubtful or uncertain, or if for
any reason an ambig·uity exists either in the policy a
whole or in portions thereof, the insured should have thl'
benefit of a favorable construction in such instancr.
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Supra.
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It ii-:i snbrnitted that when a layman purchases a
health arnl accident insurance policy, he presumes that
s>tid insura> ('P will cover personal injury sustained due
to any and all accidents. The insured in the record testified that all of tlrn repairs done to his jaw and teeth were
a direet result of the injury he· sustained through the
accident testified to. The Plaintiff in fact testified that
he was unaware that dental services were excluded from
the contract.

CONCLUSION
From a reading of the pertinent provisions of the
contract in question, one can readily see the ambiguities
which are created by the express language and the seemiHgly inconsistent intentions set forth therein. The
Plaintiff/Respondent presumed, as do all laymen, that
any and all injuries resulting from accidents would be
covered by his acccident policy. To allow the DefendantAppellant to avoid paying a legitimate charge for dental
serviees incident to accidental injury through obscurantism ·wonld lead to manifest injustice and fly in the face
of thP almost universal policy of the courts to liberally
construe insurance contracts in favor of the beneficiary
therennder, wherever possible to afford the protection
to the insured which he ·was endeavoring to secure when
lw applied for the insurance.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
D Garv Christian
.T.·
Frederick
Attorneys for PlaintiffI
Respondent
9

